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APA Monitor, 22, 7, 5, July 1991.

Use Morality as Basis for Animal Treatment, by Kenneth J. Shapiro

There now exists a spectrum of identifiable positions on the issue of
psychologists’ treatment of animals. While not wishing to further
polarize these positions, in this forum I have organized my remarks
into two sides. I refer to my own as the moderate, progressive animalwelfare position (PAW) and to the competing position as a status quo
and status quo ante position (SQA). I will include a critique of the
latter, since, unlike mine, it has already appeared in several
American Psychological Association publications.
For PAW, animals matter; they are object of moral concern. Our moral
obligation to them is compelling on the basis of their attributes:
sentience, interests, purposive behavior, telos, rights and membership
in a mixed human/animal community.
Originated by Richard Ryder, a psychologist, the concept of speciesism
holds that we violate this moral obligation when we discriminate
against or exploit individuals due to their membership in a non-human
species. The concept helps us become aware of the pervasive attitudes
and language that sustain our discrimination against animals. When we
refer to an animal as “it” we reduce him or her from an individual to
a set of species-specific behaviors; when we refer to an animal as a
“preparation” or “organism,” we further reduce him or her to a generic
process. Through this emerging consciousness-raising, fewer of us can
read about invasive research involving an animal without empathizing
with his or her plight.
In practice, most animals suffer when caged and when subjected to
invasive research procedures. Recent efforts to enrich the laboratory
setting and an occasional suggestion to rehabilitate animals following
their life in the lab can diminish that suffering and even promote
well-being. However, other changes would engender more truly humane
research and at the same time, enhance the scientific value of animal
research, since subjects would be less stressed and their behavior
less artificial. These include: conducting research in more
naturalistic settings, designing less invasive research and developing
and using non-animal models.
We can and should study non-human animals for their own sake and for
the occasional light that a comparative psychology can shed on our own
condition. But we can and should do so in the animals’ own backyard—
natural settings—where we can observe and respect the integrity of
their social and natural lives; in backyard they share with us, for
example, studying pets in their own living space and teaching students
learning theory in a city park using resident pigeons; and in

backyards we construct for them that mimic their species-specific
natural setting.
SQA promotes a philosophical position best described as permissive
utilitarianism. In this view, any animal research is justified if the
benefits to humans outweigh the cost to the animals. Beyond the wellknown limitations of this consequentialist position (as distinguished
from a deontological or “first-principles” theory of moral
philosophy), no cost-benefits analysis is actually conducted. The
“analysis” remains an empty metaphor. Yet Psychologists for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PsyETA) and others have developed
reliable scales of invasiveness (harm and injury).
Further, SQA proponents repeatedly provide lists of how research on
animals benefits humans, but the claims are not supported by evidence.
Citation analyses show that articles in applied journals devoted to
treatment of the conditions allegedly benefitted by animal research do
not cite that research. In addition, any cost-benefits analysis would
have to take into account the roads not taken—benefits missed or
delayed by undue faith in a particular animal model paradigm. An
example of this is the delay in the development of interventions in
cognitive therapy, such as the use of imagery.
Finally, it is not enough to assert that a certain animal research
produced benefits that outweighed costs; the investigator must show
that non-human animals were indispensable to conduct that research.
Instead, SQA asserts that alternatives are, in principle, impossible.
This does not square with PsyETA’s annual Humane Alternatives
publication, which consists of concrete descriptions of ways to reduce
the number of animals used in research, refine procedures to reduce
suffering, as well as replace animals altogether.
While only about 8 percent of psychologists use animals in their
research, a few of these individuals wield enough power within APA to
have systematically excluded the PAW perspective in APA publications
and convention exhibit displays and to have controlled the relevant
APA committee. PsyETA has looked systematically at research done by
chairs of APA’s Committee on Animal Research and Ethics and found that
much of it is highly invasive. Examples include a study of a monkey
living with profound behavioral and perceptual deficits following
surgically induced brain damage, a cat undergoing drug-induced
seizures and an “intruder” mouse receiving 100 bites from a “resident”
mouse. We have also compared the committee chairs’ work with other
samples, such as studies cited in introductory textbooks and studies
by their own colleagues in the same subfields, and found it more
invasive. Unless APA is to continue misrepresenting psychology to the
public and inappropriately representing animal research in its
governance, it must constitute a committee exclusively charged with
promoting animal welfare.
Given the progressiveness of APA in other areas, it is remarkable that
it should continue to respond to animal welfare issues with a program

of retrenchment and denial through which it attempts to lull those not
directly involved in the issue into believing changes are not needed
or have already been instituted. As exemplified by recent PsyETA
projects, a more constructive program would consist of a publication
on alternatives, a journal on research in humane issues, development
and application of a rating scale of invasiveness and a summer
fellowship in animal welfare issues for graduate psychology students.
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